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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THOMAS F. CRISMON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 20668

vs.
THE WESTERN COMPANY OF
NORTH AMERICA, a Delaware
corporation,

:

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
This case is not technically a statute of frauds1
case.

It is a contract case. Western's letter of January

11, 1982, is heavily relied upon by appellant as being a
"memorandum sufficient" to satisfy the statute of frauds.
Respondent's position is that a memorandum required by the
statute of frauds presupposes a prior valid agreement and
meeting of the minds of the parties; the agreement between
the parties in this case was not complete as to essential
terms and particulars so as to support an agreement, no
matter how exhaustively writing may exist to affirm parts
of the agreement.

There was simply never an agreement
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containing the essential required terms to support a claim
in this case.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

In December 1981, appellant owned five duplex

lots (4, 5, 6, 7 and 8) in Vernal, Utah.
2.

(R. 306).

At that time he had completed approximately

ninety percent of the construction on lots 4 and 5.

His

contractor was on the site and he had installed concrete
foundations and excavations on lots 6, 7 and 8.
3.

Appellant had obtained a commitment for

permanent financing on lots 6, 7 and 8.
4.

(R. 387).

(R. 306).

A meeting between Joseph Eppes and Thomas

Crismon was arranged by Tom Clark, a broker who was working
with and acting as selling agent for Thomas F. Crismon.
(R. 347).
5.

Thomas F. Crismon did not have a signed sales

agency agreement with Clark as they were both experienced
realtors and Thomas F. Crismon testified that he held a real
estate license.
6.

(R. 345).

Mr. Eppes, from his observation at the meeting

in December of 1981, testified that it appeared to him Mr.
Crismon was building the duplexes as fast as he could and
intended to go ahead notwithstanding what Mr. Eppes decided
-2-

to do.

(R. 386, 387). During their meeting in December

of 1981, Mr. Eppes and Mr. Crismon discussed general terms
for a lease and Mr. Eppes left indicating that he would
have his legal department, who had proper authority to
proceed, prepare a lease and get it to Mr. Crismon.

(R.

369, 370).
7.

The letter admitted as evidence from Joseph

Eppes dated January 11, 1982, was merely an outline of
Western Companies1 willingness to enter into and complete
negotiations for a lease with some of the basic terms as
outlined.
8.

There was substantial evidence in the record,

as testified to by Mr. Eppes, about the fact that it was
very important for The Western Company to have a total
management concept whereby the owner would be responsible
for not only complete management of the units, but for
collecting damages from the tenants or being responsible
for damages to the buildings as well.

This point was

emphasized clearly by Mr. Eppes in the discussions in
December of 1981.
9.

(R. 384, 385).

There is no direct evidence in the record

that The Western Company ever agreed to omit lot 7.
10.

In March 1982, The Western Company sent a
-3-

Lease Agreement which contained precisely the provisions
The Western Company would agree to and which encompassed
the subject matter of the negotiations and the proposed
agreement.
11.

Thereafter, in April 1982, appellant sent

a Lease Agreement to Western materially altering some of
the basic provisions in the lease, the most grievous of
which was the management responsibility provision which
was always insisted upon by The Western Company.

This

proposed lease was accompanied by a letter which on direct
examination of Crismon was composed by and contained words
of art prepared by Crismonsf attorney, although not on
Crismons! attorney's letterhead. (R. 326).
12.

Crismon testified that he received an offer

sometime in May on lot 7 and in fact based on that offer
sold lot 7 to an independent buyer in July.
13.

(R. 347) .

There is a direct contradiction of evidence

in the record as respects Mr. Eppesf recollection of
acknowledging Westerns1 agreement to the lease tendered by
Crismon and what Crismon testified to.
14.

(R. 398, 399).

In the last week of June 1982, a Lease

Agreement was again executed and sent from Western which
was the agreement Western would agree to and was open for
-4-

acceptance by Crismon up until as late as September 30,
when the month-to-month tenancy subsisting between the
parties was terminated.

(R. 399).

ARGUMENT
I
THERE WAS NEVER AN AGREEMENT ON ESSENTIAL
TERMS SUFFICIENT TO FORM A REPORT
Of critical importance in this case is the fact
that Mr. Crismon was just as experienced in real estate
matters as was Mr. Eppes.

It should also be noted that

Mr. Eppes, as an agent of the Western Company, had no
direct authority to bind The Western Company by any kind
of an oral contract and Mr. Crismon was made aware of that
fact.

Mr. Eppes indicated that the legal department

would draft the lease and the lease was in fact prepared
and sent to Crismon which contained the essential terms
certainly agreed upon by the parties and to which Western
would agree.
The lease as proposed and as sent to Mr. Crismon
was a very fair document and a good deal for Crismon.

It

was only by his assertion to change the essential terms
of the agreement to more comply to what he wanted that
cost him the entire transaction in this case.
-5-

The purpose of the statute of frauds particularly
in complicated real estate matters or long term leases is
simply to avoid the kind of mischief that presents itself
in this case.
If Mr. Crismon, with his expert real estate
knowledge, was so concerned about not proceeding until he
had a definite lease, he should have been advised to
wait until he in fact had a definite lease.

The Western

Company in good faith proposed a lease to him, but which
Mr. Crismon insisted on changing material and substantive
terms.
There must be an agreement of all terms with
sufficient definiteness.

See Campbell v. Nelson, 101 Utah

523, 125 P. 2d 413 (1942), and see also, McDonald v. Barton
Brothers Investment, 631 P. 2d 851 (Utah 1981); held a
memo insufficient where essential terms were not all
contained.

It is clear that in the present case, there

was never an executed lease because the parties simply
could not or would not agree on the significant terms.
Again, this is exactly the mischief the statute of frauds
is supposed to avoid.
One of the objective facts of this case that
is interesting is the sale of lot 7.
-6-

There is some

discussion in the Crismon letters about a zoning or
easement problem; this apparently did not prohibit him
from constructing a duplex on lot 7 and selling the
duplex in fact to a good faith offerer which offer was
received, according to his testimony, in May of 1982.
Respondent believes that this simple isolated bit of
objective evidence is indicative of the fact that at the
time Crismon accepted the offer he did not really consider
himself bound by the Western lease. The Coirrt properly
concluded that the lease was still in the negotiating
process and the ruling of the Court accurately reflects
this fact.
This Court has consistently shown reluctance
to modify the rigors of the statute of frauds with respect
to land provisions.
260 P.2d 570 (1953).

See Ravarino v. Price, 123 Utah 559,
The appellant states in his

memorandum that The Western Company submitted a lease
which did not conform to the agreement of the parties.

To

the contrary by the extensive evidence in the record from
the testimony of Mr. Eppes, the management and responsibility concept was extensively discussed.

(R. 385).

The Western lease was consistent with those discussions;
the Crismon lease was not.

Obviously there was never a

-7-

meeting of the minds and there was never a complete
agreement with respect to the lease.
The trial court in considering the exhibits
and the testimony of the witnesses properly ruled that
there was never an agreement sufficient to provide
liability in this case.
II.
APPELLANT DID NOT COMPLETE HIS PROJECT
UPON RELIANCE ON RESPONDENT'S ACTIONS
From listening to the witnesses and from the
entire record in this case, the trial court found by
clear preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Crismon was
well under way with the completion of his project and
would have completed his project in all probability in
any event if Western Company had not been involved.
This is the practical conclusion from the
entire context of the record and from the trial courtfs
direct observations based upon his observations of the
witnesses and from the testimony of the record.
Mr. Crismon was involved in a real estate
investment plan.

The record is clear he had secured

permanent financing for the whole project.

The record

is further clear and not disputed that two of the units
-8-

were ninety to ninety-five percent complete and the other
units had the foundations poured, excavation work done and
the contractor was on the site in late December of 1981.
The findings and judgment of the trial court are
entitled to a "presumption of correctness11 and will not be
upset unless the evidence "clearly preponderates against
them".

Ovard v. Cannon, 600 P.2d 1246 (Utah 1979).
III.

APPELLANT'S APRIL LEASE DOCUMENT WAS A COUNTER
OFFER; WESTERN CLEARLY REJECTED IT BY ITS TENDER
OF THE SECOND LEASE DOCUMENT IN JUNE
Much is said in Appellant's Brief about Western
continuing to pay rental for nine months.

It is important

to note that Western's position was made entirely clear to
the appellant in the second lease document which was fully
executed and sent to Crismon in June of 1982. Through the
remaining days of the month of June, the entire month of
July, the entire month of August and the first fifteen days
in September, that lease document was tendered and in the
hands of Crismon having been fully executed by Western and
which contained all of the essential terms which would have
been acceptable to Western.

Thus, for approximately ninety

days, The Western Company was in a position to be bound to
the five year lease which was consistent with Mr. Eppes'
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original negotiations.

The pure and simple fact of the

matter is, and as properly concluded by the trial court,
Crismon did not accept it and accordingly, there was no
lease.

The basic differences in the lease documents,

upon which there was apparently never a meeting of the
minds, had to do with a very important concept to The
Western Company.

The record is extensive in Mr. Eppes1

testimony concerning these matters.

(R. 385, 386).

Western wanted to secure a place for housing for its
employees, but did not want to assume responsibility for
wear, tear, depreciation and damage to the units and to
have to invest substantial sums in the units at the end
of the lease term for repainting, recarpeting and repairs.
This fact was always asserted clearly by Mr. Eppes and
was just simply never agreed to by Mr. Crismon.
It should be noted that this was the most
substantial disagreement between the parties, although
Mr. Crismon did make other changes in his proposed lease
tendered back to The Western Company, any of which were
material enough so as to convince the trial court, and
properly so, that there was never an actual agreement
containing the essential terms so as to bind anyone to
a contract in this case.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Crismon was experienced in real estate
investments and he had a real estate license.

Mr. Eppes,

although no longer employed at Western, at the time relevant
to this case was manager of their housing department.

These

were sophisticated real estate businessmen trying to come to
an understanding concerning essential terms for a long term
lease.

The trial court properly concluded, after observing

witnesses and listening to the testimony, that the essential
terms basic to the lease were never agreed upon.
simply never a meeting of the minds.

There was

Therefore, there could

be no lease formation based on any written memorandums or by
subsequent actions of the parties.

In fact, there were as

many actions on the part of Crismon evidencing the fact he
did not consider himself bound by a lease, for example, the
unilateral sale of Lot 7.
The trial court's decision should be affirmed.
DATED this ^Q^"day

of August, 1985.

Respectably submitted,
JYGXARD, COKE & VINCENT

(John R. Anderson
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